There’s an interesting discussion going on at The Intersection about civility and science—with explicit mention of Robert Boyle.
In graduate school I got pretty interested in science in the Seventeenth Century, so I was interested to see Chris quote a passage from Boyle’s The Skeptical Chemist.
I definitely agree that civility is important to scientific discussions. But here’s what I wrote about Boyle:
See also Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump. They suggest that the scientific method Boyle advocated (and argued about with Hobbes) crystallizes a particular social organization and form of interaction. Given the highly divisive context in which he was writing, Boyle advocated that the “natural philosophers” focus on the facts (those items to which everyone could assent) and to avoid metaphysical or causal claims–natural philosophers were to spend their time cataloging facts about nature.
But Boyle had in mind a particular type of natural philosopher–a Christian gentleman. Only men of a certain class status could be considered sufficiently “modest” (i.e. disinterested) to engage in this discussion about facts. The Royal Society excluded women and viewed less “gentlemanly” members (like Robert Hooke) with suspicion.
The point is that any conception of an ideal speech situation depends on some basic assumptions about the social order–who is valorized to speak, who isn’t, who is considered reasonable and who isn’t. And usually these conceptions (see also Habermas) cast out emotion, which is considered to conflict with rationality. Antonio Demasio has demonstrated that we don’t make decisions on the basis of rationality alone (see his book Descartes Error), but that emotions also play a necessary part.
Today, we can no longer confine scientific debates to “gentlemen,” or scientists, or people with certain kinds of credentials. So we need a new kind of “order” that would address the widespread public involvement in scientific debates without dismissing people as “irrational” or insufficiently educated.
Studies have suggested that the “consensus conference” or “public deliberation” models developed in Europe can be quite effective. Usually, citizens selected to participate in the discussion receive an intensive introduction to the topic at hand before they engage in deliberations. Some studies suggest that these can be quite effective (see, for instance, Einsiedel, Edna F.and Deborah L. Eastlick. "Consensus Conferences as Deliberative Democracy: A Communications Perspective." Science Communication 21 (2000): 323-43.)
But to return to emotion, most people who engage in scientific debates do so not just because they are interested in arguing facts, but because they feel passionately about the issue. Many of the models underlying consensus conferences implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) rely on Jurgen Habermas’ model of the “ideel speech situation,” which stresses rationality, consensus, and individuality. Chantal Mouffe has argued that these models are overly positivistic (assuming truth will prevail), that they avoid difference, and that they over-emphasize consensus as opposed to productive conflict. The key, Mouffe says, is that participants should seem the adversary not as the enemy, but as a legitimate participant worthy of debating.
This brings us back to rhetoric, which has historically emphasized agon, but also valorizes arguing from shared, public values and from emotion as well as from logic. Ignoring the role of emotion in persuasion has inhibited scientists’ ability to persuade audiences about important issues—it is like arguing with one hand tied behind your back. Is there a fair, “civil” way to engage in public, scientific deliberations without denying the emotional attachments people bring to the table?
This brings us back to rhetoric, which has historically emphasized agon, but also valorizes arguing from shared, public values and from emotion as well as from logic. Ignoring the role of emotion in persuasion has inhibited scientists’ ability to persuade audiences about important issues—it is like arguing with one hand tied behind your back. Is there a fair, “civil” way to engage in public, scientific deliberations without denying the emotional attachments people bring to the table?
ReplyDeleteSadly, there is not a way to do that, nor are too many scientists trying to. Many of my colleagues who do go into th epublic square, ostensibly to defend science from (for instance) creationist attack, are just as emotion boun din their defense of science as they are in their attack on religious based disbelief of science. PZ Myers is the embodyment of this, but many of his fellow Science Bloggers exhibt the trait to some extent.
Rather then deny the emotional component, or try to "out emotion" the other side, I would humbly suggest that effective emotion based rhetoric may be useful. One can, if one chooses, take time to craft a refutation of counter argments that hsows ones own emotional attachment to a poistion - all the while never attacking the othersides similar emotional attachment to their views.
I agree Phillip--and that's exactly what I was getting at. We all have emotional attachments and values, and emotions can play an important role in arguments. But they are too often excluded as "irrational" or "unscientific."
ReplyDeleteWe could take this down to a more fundamental level of audience and purpose. Scientists that get involved in public disputes are no longer dealing with arguments of the same type as those in science. There is no certain truth value that any scientist can offer about whether or not, for example, we should build nuclear power plants. They might offer compelling evidence to support particular benefits or risks; however, these benefits and risks would not be sufficient to encompass all the issues, like social fairness, that would be relevant to the debate.
ReplyDeletePerhaps, if a better picture of the strengths and limitations of scientific and non-scientific arguments were better understood by both scientists and the public there would be less conflict as a result of under- or over estimating the strength of particular lines of reasoning. The question is how do we get both groups to the table to understand this complexities of this dynamic? Rhetoricians and other specialists in scientific and public communication seem to be uniquely positioned to make inroads in these areas. There is a new study out in the latest issue of _Science Communication_ that discusses the results of an education program sponsored by the EU whose aim was to try to make scientists aware of some of the differences between deliberative public policy debate and the media and scientific ways of arguing and considering problems.
There is no certain truth value that any scientist can offer about whether or not, for example, we should build nuclear power plants. They might offer compelling evidence to support particular benefits or risks; however, these benefits and risks would not be sufficient to encompass all the issues, like social fairness, that would be relevant to the debate.
ReplyDeleteJames, I have to disagree. Scientists may not want to make those "certian truth value" statements (which in another filed I belive are called normative), but it doesn't mean they can't. For me, having purposely "demoted" myself from doing field science to doing scince policy, I see a lot of scientists getting asked to declare which is the "best path" on a number of issues. Those asking for this declaration often do so as a way to protect themsleves politically, but the request is, actually, quite valid. When scientists answer that request in the usual, cautionary, loaded wirh caveats way that we are trained to do, the political side (which is operating from a mainly emotional basis) dismisses science from the square, so to speak.
But that doesn't mean scientists can't stand up and say "I believe that we should do X, and here's all the per reviewed literature that says why." Its just that we don't.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "dismisses science from the square"--do you mean that the politicians don't seem to understand the hedges and modifiers in scientists' speech?
ReplyDeletePhilip, there may be instances in which the information the scientist provides is sufficient to make policy. The point I am trying to make is that in many cases public policy issues are complex and can't be fully supported or rationalized based on empirical evidence provided by scientists. Even a "best path" argument is only part of a policy argument because there are always questions of implementation of paths that will be raised which may take deliberation outside of the purview of science.
ReplyDeleteI don't really feel like we are at odds on this point. You seem to be suggesting that scientists either don't choose to give their honest professional opinions on subjects of their expertise or that lawmakers throw out their opinions if they become to heavily hedged for the black and white world of policy. This seems not to be in conflict with the point that there are dimensions of policy such as social justice which the professional opinions of scientists may not typically engage.